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Abstract
This study offers an explanation for Beijing’s seemingly self-defeating approach to the South China 
Sea that distances China ever more from the regional and international communities which it 
wants to lead and join while drawing in the foreign military presence that it seeks to keep at a 
distance. Combining recent research on the role of emotions and on hierarchy in international 
politics, this article shows how the powerful narrative of national ‘humiliation’ and ‘rejuvenation’ 
has informed Chinese maritime politics. As the South China Sea became incorporated in the 
linear timeline of China’s 5000 year civilizational history, the US’ and its allies’ push-back against 
Beijing’s territorial claims deepened China’s ideational isolation. The ensuing state of solipsism 
increases the risk of violent confrontations.
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Introduction
In November 2012, Xi Jinping, the newly elected General-Secretary of the Communist 
Party of China (CPC) and Chairman of the Central Military Commission led the other six 
members of the Politburo Standing Committee through the National Museum at 
Tiananmen Square. The highly symbolic visit by the party-state’s inner circle provided 
the setting for the most powerful leader since Mao Zedong to renew the Party’s pledge to 
fulfil its historical mission and make China great again. Walking through the Road of 
Rejuvenation permanent exhibition, Xi reportedly paid special attention to exhibits on 
the First Opium War (1840–2) and to charts illustrating the humiliating history of ‘how 
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the West had occupied China’s territories, established concessions and carved-out 
spheres of influence’.1 Media reports also emphasized him looking at photos of the 
Central Committee session at which Deng Xiaoping launched the ‘epoch-making reform 
and opening up drive’. In the subsequent speech The Road Towards Renewal, touted as 
‘a retrospective on the Chinese nation, a celebration of its present and a declaration on its 
future’, Xi reminded his countrymen and women that ‘the Chinese nation had suffered 
unusual hardship and sacrifice in the world’s history’ and pointed out that ‘the Chinese 
people have never given in, have struggled ceaselessly, and have finally taken hold of 
their own destiny and started the great process of building the nation’.2
This speech and media coverage not only located China but also every Chinese citizen 
on the linear timeline of development such as it continues to constitute international 
hierarchy. Referring ‘to the country’s hard-earned finding of a correct road towards reju-
venation and its remarkable achievements’, that is China climbing upwards in the hierar-
chy, Xi also cited from a poem: ‘I will mount a long wind some day and break the heavy 
waves’. The state-guided media clarified that ‘after more than 170 years of hard struggle 
since the Opium War, the Chinese nation has bright prospects, is closer than ever to 
reaching its goal of great renewal’.3
The emphasis on the trauma of ‘national humiliation’ and the hope for and path 
towards ‘rejuvenation’, including the allusion to the seas, proved to be highly conse-
quential. In early 2015, media reports revealed that China had been engaged in large-
scale land reclamation and reinforced several of the disputed reefs and rocks in the 
Spratly area of the South China Sea.4 Predictably, the clandestine manner and unprece-
dented scale – fleets of dredging ships had been constructing a ‘great wall of sand’5 
through the enlargement of no less than seven features including major runways and 
harbours – elicited widespread condemnation. Not only the rival claimants of Vietnam 
and the Philippines but also US, Japanese, and Australian policy-makers decried the 
Chinese move as provocative, violating international laws and norms, and thereby under-
mining the ‘rules-based international order’.6 Highly publicized and in line with its long-
standing practice,7 the US Navy intensified so-called Freedom of Navigation Operations 
(FONOPS) in the South China Sea,8 and the Japanese government dispatched subma-
rines and large helicopter carriers to Southeast Asia with the intention of ‘sending strong 
messages’.9 Much to the Chinese government’s dismay, the G-7 leaders repeatedly criti-
cized Beijing’s behaviour too.10 Thus, the Xi administration managed in a few years to 
bring about the opposite of Beijing’s principal strategic objectives: To be recognized as 
a peacefully developing, responsible member of the international community, and to 
safeguard China’s sovereignty by keeping foreign, especially US forces, at a distance.
How is this seemingly self-defeating course of action by a leadership that is deemed 
exceptionally apt in strategic thinking and policy-making explainable? Why did the 
Chinese government deliberately follow a policy line that would arouse widespread con-
cerns, condemnation, and in turn rekindle Chinese leaders’ and people’s feelings of 
national humiliation? Answers to these questions not only address the empirical question 
how far the Chinese leadership may be ready to go in defending its claims. The examina-
tion of Sino-US South China Sea politics also provides a case for the study of collective 
memory and of emotions through the linking of trauma with a specific instance of inter-
national hierarchy.
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The present study suggests that international hierarchy centred on ‘Western’ interna-
tional community of developed and democratic states made it difficult for the non-West-
ern, underdeveloped and communist-party-ruled China collectively, and people in China 
individually, to communicate grief that stems from past violence and thus obstructed the 
re-construction of new identities. The national trauma, manifest in the discourse of 
‘national humiliation’, persists despite rapidly increasing material power and deepens 
China’s ideational insulation. Thus, international hierarchy spurs the Communist Party’s 
continuing quest for national ‘rejuvenation’ by making China the Maritime Power 
(Haiyang daguo) that, through its assertiveness, partially reproduces the very memories 
and feelings of national humiliation that it is supposed to overcome.
The line of argument proceeds in five steps. In the next section, I link recent advance-
ments in the study of emotions in world politics to the constitutional effects of interna-
tional hierarchy and its effects on Sino-US geopolitics in the South China Sea. Thereafter, 
I introduce the concept of trauma time as a means to operationalize the role of emotions 
in hierarchical international politics.11 Subsequently, I revisit the revival of China’s 
‘national humiliation’ narrative as an indication for China’s unresolved collective trau-
mata. Then, I show how the South China Sea has become an integral part of China’s 
imagined historical trajectory from humiliation to rejuvenation. This insight suggests 
that the Sino-US geopolitical contest, as discussed in the subsequent section, has been 
nurturing the national victimization narrative. Last, I point to the problematic dynamic 
that this emerging ideational isolation or solipsism on the part of China entails.
Emotions, international hierarchy and the South China Sea
Although the emotion of fear is central to the inquiry into, it is rarely operationalized in 
studies of contemporary politics.12 Even though recent scholarship refuted earlier con-
cerns with scientific quality,13 the predominant view continues to treat actions based on 
fear, anger, shame, grief, hatred and hope as mere aberrations from the otherwise rational 
behaviour of the modern subject.14 Emotions that lead to so-called misperceptions tend 
to be attributed to the unreasonable ‘other’ and are seen as the very traits of human 
behaviour that need to be rooted out; usually through sufficiently strong and well-crafted 
postures of deterrence. Moreover, few studies have systematically analysed the impor-
tant role of emotions in (international) politics beyond the Euro-Atlantic.15 This short-
coming may be pronounced in analyses of Asia–Pacific affairs.16 Therefore, the 
dimension of international hierarchy is often underappreciated. Likewise, few discus-
sions of international hierarchy make emotions their focus of analysis.17 This is intrigu-
ing given that the defining vocabulary of ‘shifting’ and ‘rising’ powers display an 
emotional ‘expression of our vulnerability to events that we don’t control’.18
International hierarchy engenders a rather contradictory conception China’s place in 
the world. While most outside observers are anxious about an assertively ‘rising China’ 
remaking world order according to its own preferences, Chinese policy-makers fear the 
consequences of being weak; of a China that fails to advance fast enough, remains an 
outsider to the international community, and consequently faces the prospects of societal 
disorder, foreign encroachment, and even dismemberment.19 In Callahan’s words, China 
is a ‘pessoptimist’ nation.20 Fear of the future co-exists with hope for a better future, such 
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as President Xi expounded it in his formulation of the Chinese Dream.21 It is the CPC’s 
long-standing aspiration to, first, realize a ‘moderately well-off society’ and second, to 
become a respected member of the international community.22 The leadership even set 
itself and every Chinese person deadlines for achieving them: The former by the cente-
nary of the CPC’s founding in 2021 and the latter by the centenary of the founding of the 
People’s Republic in 2049.23 Hence, the Party sees the first two decades of the twenty-
first century as a ‘period of strategic opportunity’ not to be missed.24
Hierarchy conceals these emotions: Those showing emotions are seen as behaving 
unreasonably and their concerns and claims are, therefore, invalid or insignificant.25 
The dismissal of Chinese emotional reactions as purely instrumental, as the Party’s 
tactical use of nationalism, is a direct outflow of this view.26 Because deliberately 
exaggerated and distorted ‘facts’ will elicit reactions from target audiences and may 
eventually become commonly held beliefs, also among the very manipulators, it is 
largely irrelevant whether emotional outbursts are part or results of a propaganda 
offensive or not. To the contrary, in their desire to portray themselves as strong leaders 
in control of every situation and contingency, officials will likely tone down the full 
extent of their individual disapproval and conceal their personal fears through the use 
of diplomatic jargon. Since escalating maritime conflicts are seen as epitome for how 
the power shift towards China destabilizes the established ‘rule-based order’, the 
South China Sea provides an insightful case for showing ‘how exactly [. . .] hierar-
chies create the trade-offs that (later) shape behavior’.27
While clashes between Beijing and Washington are well documented, studies that 
apply conventional methodologies display great difficulties with explaining the repeti-
tion of escalatory ‘mistakes’ and ‘miscalculations’, including officials’ refusal to use 
communication hotlines and their clear tendencies to believe in conspiracy theories 
amid the continuous build-up of antagonistic military postures.28 Methodologically 
more critical studies made the strong case for the relevance of deeply entrenched his-
torical narratives, the so-called century of national humiliation in particular, in framing 
Beijing’s interpretations of the international environment and determining foreign and 
security political responses. Gries, for instance, points to the lasting humiliation that 
the Chinese leaders and public felt after the US in May 1999 bombed the Chinese 
embassy in Belgrade.29 Wang’s study shows in detail how these feelings led Chinese 
decision-makers to interpret the Belgrade bombing as US-led ploy to create chaos and 
topple the CPC. The same case also strongly supports the argument that China’s trans-
formation to a capitalist economy led to a rekindling of national humiliation narratives 
and pushed leaders such as President Jiang Zemin – known for his personal emotional 
outbursts upon what he perceived as lack of respect for his country – to put utmost 
premium at increasing China’s status through boosting ‘comprehensive national 
power’, that is the twenty-first century version of the ‘rich nation strong army’ para-
digm originally propagated by twentieth century nationalists.30
In the same vein as the Belgrade embassy bombing, the collision of a Chinese fighter 
jet with a US EP-3 reconnaissance plane over the South China Sea that caused the 
Chinese pilot’s death and led to a controversy over the arrest of the US crew after their 
emergency landing deepened Chinese indignation. The foreign ministry repeatedly 
asserted that China’s national sovereignty and dignity should not be violated and insisted 
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that the American government apologize and take responsibility for the troubles caused 
to China.31 Shepperd, explicitly theorizing these emotions, found that while the US 
sought to bolster their position through references to international law, Chinese leaders 
and the public alike felt bullied and lamented the US’ hegemonic attitude.32 Noting the 
use of strongly emotional language and seemingly excessive insistence on a US apology, 
and recognizing that the ‘betrayal’ of hitherto practised rules of interaction led the situa-
tion deteriorate at ‘alarming’ speed, she points to the long-standing Chinese fears of 
encirclement fueled by the narrative of national humiliation. Hutchison goes one analyti-
cal step further. Examining the memory politics described by Wang and others, she finds 
that people in China have been unable to ‘act out’ their trauma.33 Yet, while pointing to 
the crucial role of community in this process, her conclusion stops with a reference to the 
need for critical reflection. Here, an explicit theorizing of international hierarchy and a 
discussion of evidence beyond instances of diplomatic crisis management promises 
deeper insights.34
Warped trauma time and the linear time of the state
Experiences are traumatic when they are ‘too horrible to be remembered’ and to be 
‘integrated into our symbolic universe’.35 This is true especially for violence directed 
at individuals. Victims feel a deep sense of betrayal and loss of trust in their immediate 
social worlds and, hence, also in their own ability to act as independent agents.36 As 
Edkins elaborates, traumatic events reveal the radical contingency of social order. 
Thrown out of the world that we all take for granted, and unable to make sense of what 
happened, the victim must not only fear the possible return of violent encounter at any 
moment, he or she is also unable to communicate the meaning of the painful – unim-
aginable and unspeakable – experience to others.37 As a result, it is very difficult for 
the victim of violence38 to regain a new understanding and purpose of his or her place 
in a given social world:
the boundaries of meaning are circumscribed by a frozen picture of the past, which continues 
to structure interaction with others. Held captive by this picture, the self engages with the world 
as if past and present were inseparable, and as if the world were her world of trauma’.39 Being 
caught in this emotional warp is what Edkins calls ‘trauma time.40
The only way to regain a sense of control – or ontological security – leads through the 
gradual sharing of grief and reflection about the traumatic experiences with others. 
Others who acknowledge the victim’s pain and assist him or her to regain confidence in 
the self and in their world through the reattribution of meaning to the past, while also 
directing attention towards reconstructing a new future. In other words, it is necessary to 
‘encircle’ the traumatic experience in order to gradually restore a linear timeline of exist-
ence compatible with the social structures of contemporary society.41
In a modern society such as the CPC forcefully propagates it, belonging to certain 
national communities inevitably defines social worlds. Yet, imaginations of linear and 
therefore reassuringly transcendent accounts of national histories are always precarious. 
Collective memory is incompatible with the individual memories that it absorbs into 
30 International Relations 34(1)
national narratives of common suffering, heroic sacrifice, and redemption or salvation. 
This tension is especially pronounced when the national community refuses to recognize 
the victim’s grief. Worse, when the community and its representatives are the very per-
petrators of violence. Instances of large-scale violence, then, impose a particular strong 
demand for the assimilation of individual narratives into national narratives. For the 
national community to remain united, authorities must provide an instant and credible 
story about the causes for past suffering and embed it into the community’s journey to 
the prosperous future: the linear time of the state.42
In this way, the aforementioned Road to Rejuvenation exhibition creates the depoliti-
cizing time of the state.43 In China’s case, it is the time of the (Han-)civilizational state.44 
Chinese history is narrated as a linear path that starts with the Qin dynasty. According to 
official historiography, a peaceful order had been established and laid the foundation for 
China’s prosperity when the first emperor forcibly unified a great number of disparate 
and incessantly warring kingdoms in 221 BC. The 5000 year march through history cul-
minates with the display of modern China’s proud achievements. The steady if not expo-
nential increase of industrial output, the electrification of Chinese households, the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) wielding advanced weaponry and participating in 
United Nations peacekeeping operations, and the successful pushing of civilizational 
boundaries through the Xuelong ice-breaker’s explorations of the polar ice caps, the 
Jiaolong manned submersible’s charting of the deep oceans, and the Long March rock-
ets’ supplying the Tiangong space station.45
Yet, as the strong insistence on national unity and expedient progress from the ‘cen-
tury of national humiliation’ to ‘national rejuvenation’ amid a successful rekindling of 
the national victimization narrative suggests, the traumata of past violence have proven 
hard to overcome. The onslaught of European empires, culminating in the Middle 
Kingdom’s subjugation to previously peripheral Japan from 1931 onwards, features most 
prominently. While the so-called semi-colonization and the ensuing civil wars shattered 
the Chinese people’s worlds, interstate wars destroyed China’s world.46
Defeat means a loss of control, or profound ontological insecurity, by the looser over 
his or her future. It is compounded by the fact that the history of the conflict is written by 
the victor; the defeated also loses control over the own past.47 Thus, the victimized or 
defeated, individually and as a community, respectively, struggle to find the words that 
can convey their grief and find empathic listeners for their stories about what happened. 
Consequently, trauma gives rise to a ‘hardening of boundaries between self and others, 
in an attempt to reduce vulnerability’.48 This can lead to ideational isolation or solipsism. 
Solipsism denotes the emotional state when an individual, due to a traumatic experience, 
retreats or flights from a shared reality to an inner world which is only open to compre-
hension by that individual, who inhabits it all alone: ‘the world and my world’ becomes 
to be experienced as ‘one and the same thing’.49
In such situations, anger and the drive for revenge are often the only available means 
for restoring the minimum of self-respect and dignity that are required for keeping some-
one going and avoid him or her falling into self-destructive behaviour.50 This is because, 
as Fierke explains, the most important emotion that lies behind anger (and fear) is shame; 
shame that is often denied because we are ‘ashamed of being ashamed’.51 While shame 
is directed at oneself, anger is directed at the other: ‘the self, unable to acknowledge 
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painful emotions inside, articulates the problem outward, as betrayal or humiliation by 
another’, and ‘an Other may reinforce the boundaries separating the isolated self through 
further denial’.52 That is, traumatic experiences cause two seemingly contradictory emo-
tional reactions: Shame for being unable to resist someone taking away all that we hold 
dear, including our own agency and self-respect, and anger at the perpetrated injustice. 
The former haunts the victim in the form of constant fear of being deprived of agency 
again, and thus being humiliated once more. The latter spurs the victim into action to 
prove, especially to the perpetrator and to the self, that the violent acts were wrong and 
that the self is not to blame. This can only be done if the victim succeeds in restoring 
agency by finding empathic listeners for his or her story about what happened. Hence, 
international hierarchy manifests itself not only in an actor’s power to take away anoth-
er’s self-respect but also in the capacity to suppress or acknowledge another’s story.
As we have seen, the CPC under Xi Jinping redoubled its efforts to rectify past injus-
tice and overwrite China’s humiliating history – such as it is officially narrated – through 
achieving a moderately well-off society and regaining recognition as a (responsible) 
great power until 2021 and 2049, respectively. The present analytical framework is capa-
ble of shedding more light on the reasons behind the extraordinary strength and persis-
tence of this motivational structure as it propels China’s maritime policies.
China’s recurrent traumata
Mao Zedong’s famous declaration in 1949 that ‘the Chinese (people) have stood up’53 
did not mean the fulfilment of the CPC’s or his personal mission.54 Despite the downfall 
of the Japanese Empire and defeat of the rivalling Nationalists, siege mentality, an indi-
cation of ideational isolation, continued to hold sway over the Communist leadership. 
Increasingly paranoid, Mao personally and the party-state leadership collectively, 
remained caught in their own worlds and suffered great anxiety.55 Hence, Mao continu-
ously adhered to an aggressive revolutionary stance in both domestic and international 
politics. Not only did his CPC fail to restore China’s linear trajectory towards prosperity 
and peace beyond national independence, Mao’s policies also meant the breaking of 
countless individual and communal timelines that had persisted or been restored after the 
civil war had ended in 1949. As China remained isolated even in the communist camp, 
Mao’s zealous modernization drive engendered further traumata.
Disconnected from the reality of ordinary people, the state turned on its citizens: 
aimed at fast catching-up with Western industrialization, the massive collectivization 
programmes of the Great Leap Forward led to the premature death of more than 40 
million people between 1958 and 1962.56 This extremely traumatic event in Chinese 
history engendered a further series of equally disruptive atrocities.57 When Mao’s fac-
tion started the Cultural Revolution (1966–76) to purge potential challengers and 
thereby dismantled the very party-state the CPC had been building, people also turned 
against one another: students denounced teachers, neighbours accused each other, and 
even family members allowed the mob to publicly humiliate, expropriate and kill their 
closest on the grounds of alleged anti-revolutionary mindsets.58 Thus, people in China 
suffered the greatest possible – unimaginable and therefore unspeakable – loss of trust 
in their immediate social worlds.59
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These traumatic events allowed Deng Xiaoping to embark on the radically different 
reform and opening-up policy. The subsequent advances in agricultural and industrial 
development led to incipient prosperity and enabled a great many individuals to rebuild 
their worlds as they envisioned new, linear trajectories into promising futures. At the 
same time, Deng’s developmental success allowed the Communist Party to reconstruct 
the linear time of China’s path to rejuvenation, including its re-joining of the interna-
tional community. Yet, forceful economic restructuring combined with the displacement 
of rural communities for the sake of development stirred public unrest. Deng’s fear that 
protests would lead to a recurrence of chaos and derail China from its developmental 
track misled him to partially recreate the very traumatic experiences that he sought to 
avoid when ordering troops to Tiananmen Square in June 1989.60 The People’s Liberation 
Army’s attack on the people could not be integrated in the narrative of China’s path to 
rejuvenation and became taboo. Moreover, the crackdown meant that China was going 
against the tide of the time. Since it threatened the coherence of the equally linear narra-
tive of the world’s inevitable ‘Westernizing’ and the ‘ending of history’,61 the Communist 
Party leadership became isolated and retreated into siege mentality once more.62
Instead of being ‘situated within a social world where the painful experience has 
meaning within a [national as well as international] community such that the bereaved 
receives the necessary support over time to redefine [their] place in everyday life’, much 
of peoples’ grief became ‘accompanied by betrayal and isolation’ and lead to the continu-
ation of trauma.63 Thus, China’s ‘rise’ coincided with the resurgence of status anxiety and 
rekindled feelings of victimhood and national humiliation.64 As we have seen, emotions 
of shame result from memories and corresponding fears of renewed loss of control over 
the self, and the exposure of that loss in ways that suggest to others and, crucially, also to 
the victim him or herself, that he or she lacks agency, and potentially deprives him or her 
of being respected as a human.65 Therefore, contrary to giving up and turning upon one-
self, ‘living well is the best revenge’.66 This approach to overcoming humiliation is not 
without caveats, though. Because living well depends on industrial development along 
the ideal of US-led modernization, a repudiation of China’s success in following that 
model may dash the hope of becoming part of the prosperous ‘West’ and raises the spec-
tre of further humiliation.67 This is why foreign criticisms pointing at socio-economic 
problems, which are also seen as likely impediments within China, exacerbate feelings 
of national humiliation. They confirm pre-existing anxieties and suggest that Chinese 
leaders could lose control over their country’s fate and might be unable to steer it along 
the linear path of development and national rejuvenation.
These circumstances give rise to a contradictory emotional pattern. The straightening 
of China’s civilizational timeline for overcoming the national trauma requires both suc-
cessful socio-economic development and foreign recognition. Yet, since the negative 
appraisal of rising China as a threat, especially from the US, brings some recognition as 
an independent actor in international relations too, development may take precedence 
over the maintenance of good relations. Hence, China’s foreign policy–induced national 
trauma persists and helps the Party to continue demanding greater sacrifice from the 
people for the sake of development and national security.68 From the mid-1990s onwards, 
this developmental drive came to propel China’s pushing of the maritime frontier further 
into the deep seas.
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The national rejuvenation dream and the South China Sea
The discovery of marine development as a new ‘growth engine’, in conjunction with the 
post-Tiananmen patriotic education campaign’s emphasis on national victimhood,69 led 
to the incorporation of the South China Sea into the 5000 year timeline of the Chinese 
state. The National Museum’s panels pertaining to each of the phases of China’s Road to 
Rejuvenation depict the South China Sea as part of the country ever since 221 BC. Yet, 
political maps not only create the impression that the nation has always been there, 
immutably frozen in time and space and therefore reassuringly persistent into the distant 
future. As Callahan demonstrated, these cartographic representations of China are also 
highly emotional. They mourn the loss of national territory and are aspirational in that 
they stake out the territories to be recovered.70 The Communist Party not only appropri-
ated the infamous nine-dash line drawn by a middle-ranking officer of the rivalling 
Nationalist Party in the 1930s; they also elevated its safeguarding to a matter of national 
survival.71 Increasingly tied to China’s (territorial) integrity, this projection of ‘newly 
written borders backward in time’72 morphed into a de facto ‘core interests’ in a manner 
that had ‘never applied to its land border disputes’.73
The strengthening developmental imperative entrenched Chinese leaders’ urge to 
control the seas to the extent that the successful assertion of maritime claims came to be 
perceived as a precondition for the nation’s development, and for achieving the China 
Dream.74 In 1998 already, the first White Paper on Marine Development had asserted 
that ocean development was nothing less than a condition for the success of China’s 
modernization project: ‘As a major developing country with a long coastline, China must 
take exploitation and protection of the ocean as a long-term strategic task before it can 
achieve the sustainable development of its national economy’.75 The inclusion of ocean 
development in the 11th Five–Year Plan of 2006 accelerated efforts to develop the seas, 
for the stimulation of growth, and for the assertion of international status. This drive 
experienced another push after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis put millions of migrant 
workers out of their jobs and prompted the leadership to dispense an enormous $586 bil-
lion stimulus package while introducing new special economic zones.76 The 12th Five-
Year Plan increased emphasis on the marine economy even further and the State Oceanic 
Administration (SOA) started publishing annual reports on China’s Ocean Development.77 
In line with the overall objective to boost comprehensive national power,78 the blueprint 
for national development from 2011 to 2015 proclaimed ‘the importance of integrated 
maritime indicators is growing’ as a means to avoid being ‘left behind’ and to ‘catch up 
with worldwide trends’.79 The state-guided media hailed the marine economy a new 
‘growth engine’,80 and officials elevated it to a ‘strategic level’ for China’s develop-
ment.81 At the same time, during the 18th Party Congress of 2012, the incoming leaders 
Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang pledged to enhance China’s capacity for marine resource 
exploitation, to safeguard its maritime rights, and to make it a maritime power. The head 
of the SOA elaborated that a country requires the comprehensive strength to develop, 
use, protect, control and manage maritime areas.82 Given the ‘complicated’ situations, 
both domestic and international, this strategy appeared to be the only way forward for 
developing China into a World Power.83 Subsequent government work reports and policy 
papers consistently reiterated this emphasis on coordinated ocean development.84
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China’s turn to the seas, the quest to becoming a maritime power, represents the desire 
to become an industrially advanced country and a respected member of the (Western) 
international community. Thereby, ocean development restores the linear timeline of the 
Chinese civilizational state. This is even more important given the persistence of the 
strongly self-denying view that ‘land civilizations’, such as China’s, have historically 
been inferior to the ‘maritime civilizations’ of the ‘West’ and Japan.85 As Xie points out, 
the documentary ‘Toward the Sea’ aired by the country’s main broadcaster in December 
2011 reveals this driving force behind (ocean) development. It is reminiscent of the now 
disgraced 1988 television series He Shang [River Elegy]. Particularly the title of its first 
segment ‘Searching for a Dream’ had stirred great controversies due to its modernist 
portrayal of traditional Chinese culture – land-based as opposed to western ocean-based 
culture – as being backward and the cause for China’s underdevelopment. In a display of 
deep-rooted feelings of shame, it conveyed the message that China must throw its culture 
overboard, that is negate the self and Westernize to become prosperous and respected (by 
the ‘West’ and by itself).
Consequently, the projection of the desire for national development into the maritime 
sphere means that to renounce maritime territorial claims would be tantamount to give 
up hope for achieving national modernization and rejuvenation project itself. China’s 
imagined 5000 year trajectory through time would be broken again, or come to an end 
altogether. This is the context in which specific policies such as new laws aimed at ‘pro-
tecting’ islands through development,86 including land reclamation in the South China 
Sea, must be understood.
Solipsism and China’s future past?
From Beijing’s perspective, China is once again being ‘bullied’ and must redouble its 
efforts to overcome ‘national humiliation’. Foreign pressure in the East and South China 
seas all but confirms this rationale.87 Until recently, it was only a minority of outspoken 
‘naval nationalists’ who voiced this kind of concern.88 Yet, since around 2008, this view 
on maritime issues has been spreading. Wang identified three common messages in mass 
media coverage: ‘the alleged theft of resources by foreign countries, a presumed con-
spiracy of the United States, and a call for stronger positions to confront foreign chal-
lenges’.89 Indicating solipsistic tendencies, China is always portrayed as the victim, not 
the aggressor. Because these messages have been falling on open ears, positively at home 
and negatively abroad, it is problematic to distinguish them from the ‘real’ and ostensibly 
more rational views of the elites.
Nurtured by a continuous string of seemingly minor but no less publicized incidents 
emerging from surveillance activities at sea, the national humiliation discourse lost 
none of its salience, and led to a deepening of China’s ideational isolation. In March 
2001 already, a Chinese frigate, according to US courses, ‘aggressively confronted’ an 
oceanographic survey ship of the US Navy and ordered it to leave the exclusive eco-
nomic zone (EEZ).90 In March 2009, a US vessel with a similar task was harassed by 
five Chinese vessels that ‘shadowed and aggressively maneuvered in dangerously close 
proximity’.91 In March and May of the same year, this kind of encounters recurred.92 
Each time, the Chinese Foreign Ministry protested vehemently against US protests.93 
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As the action-reaction cycle of negative emotions deepened, wartime history remained 
ever present and seemingly prone to repeat itself.
As tensions between Beijing and Washington increased, the disconnect between 
China and its neighbours widened. During the 2010 Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) foreign ministers’ meeting in Hanoi, successive representatives raised 
the issue of Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. Yet, after Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton – on the background of large-scale US military manoeuvers against 
North Korea in the Yellow Sea – declared the so-called freedom of navigation in East 
Asian waters a US national interest, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi reacted furiously. The 
apparent ganging-up against China prompted him to leave the meeting and return with a 
passionate speech in which he declared that ‘China is a big country and other countries 
are small countries, and that’s just a fact’.94 For Chinese representatives, criticisms from 
its neighbours were incomprehensible. Unable to communicate painful historical experi-
ences to the international community, they seemed caught in their own world.
At the same time, Japanese leaders acting in line with the US fueled Chinese feelings 
of humiliation and fears of containment. Under the impression of a major controversy 
over maritime territorial delimitation in 2010, Japan’s nationalization of some of the 
disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islets in 2012 drew particularly harsh reactions from Beijing. 
A senior official went as far as warning Japan that ‘the indignation of the Chinese people 
will erupt like a volcano’, and the ‘“purchase” would do no less damage to China-Japan 
relations than an atomic bomb’.95 Beijing subsequently enhanced patrols at sea and in the 
air, and declared an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) to match the existing US–
Japanese ADIZ and counter Japan’s perceived ‘hyping of the China threat’. However, 
instead of leading to the acknowledgement of China’s past suffering and assistance in 
resisting what Beijing sees as Japan’s ‘outright denial of the outcomes of victory in the 
war against fascism’ and ‘grave challenge to the post-war international order’,96 these 
moves nurtured the view of China as aggressively expansionist.97 Consequently, US offi-
cials came under heightened pressure to commit to allied defence of the Senkakus.98
In Beijing’s eyes, foreign attempts to ‘shape’99 or curb China’s rise intensified, and 
mandated robust response. In December 2013, a PLA warship stopped a US guided-
missile destroyer from shadowing the Chinese aircraft carrier in the South China Sea100 
and in August 2014, a Chinese fighter jet intercepted a US Navy anti-submarine warfare 
plane in a move that Pentagon officials called ‘unprofessional’, ‘very dangerous’, and 
‘inconsistent with customary international law’.101 The prospect of China pushing back 
by establishing another ADIZ in the South China Sea loomed large, too.102 Yet, when US 
Secretary of Defense Hagel accused Beijing of ‘destabilising’ the South China Sea, and 
threatening the region’s long-term progress,103 the Chinese representative condemned his 
as ‘a speech which tastes of hegemony, a speech with expressions of coercion and intimi-
dation, a speech with flaring rhetoric that usher destabilizing factors into the Asia-Pacific 
to stir up trouble, and a speech with unconstructive attitude’.104
The confrontation deepened once it became clear that China had been reclaiming 
large areas in the Spratly group of the South China Sea and was constructing berths and 
runways capable of hosting major troop contingents. This move invited widespread con-
demnation. Prime Minister Abe of Japan seemed to be particularly eager for the G-7 
leaders to include strong wording in their joint statement.105 Consequently, Beijing 
36 International Relations 34(1)
became more isolated. Despite that the Chinese representative at the 2016 Shangri La 
symposium, Admiral Sun Jianguo, objected US Secretary of Defense Carter’s suggestion 
that China risked isolating itself, such isolation had already become reality. Sun uninten-
tionally confirmed this when he stated: ‘Actually I am worried that some people and 
countries are still looking at China with the Cold War mentality and prejudice. They may 
build a wall in their minds and end up isolating themselves’, and when he emphasized 
that ‘China will not be bullied, including over a pending international court ruling over 
its claims in the vital trade route’, and asserted that ‘we do not make trouble, but we have 
no fear of trouble’.106 More trouble came. Washington started highly publicized so-called 
freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) against the Chinese expansion. Beijing 
deemed them violations of international law ignoring others’ sovereign security and mar-
itime interests, and labelled them as a conduct of maritime hegemony in the name of 
‘freedom of navigation’,107 that is, an outflow of American exceptionalism.108 
Subsequently, even Chinese scholars known for their liberal stance argued that ‘the so 
called FONOPs [. . .] not only misinterpreted international law, but also intentionally 
violated China’s domestic law and deliberately humiliated China’.109 In other words, 
underlying the rhetoric of security imperatives, feelings of national humiliation drove 
Beijing’s assertion of maritime territorial control.
Whether intended or not, the Obama administration’s strategic response to China’s 
(perceived) assertive rise and US allies’ increasing demands for reassurance, the so-
called ‘pivot’ towards the Asia-Pacific greatly reinforced this emotional downwards spi-
ral. Authoritative figures designated the shifting of 60% of US naval and overseas air 
force assets to the Pacific, and the US countering of China’s alleged110 Anti-Area Access 
Denial strategy (A2/AD) with the Air-Sea Battle Doctrine, as the work of ‘the invisible 
hand behind the rising tension in the South China Sea’.111 They also saw the policy 
papers on twenty-first century Seapower, the National Security Strategy, the National 
Military Strategy, and the Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, all released in 2015, 
as further proof that US wants to ‘make China pay the price’, and warned against a future 
Sino-US conflict. The disputes in the South China Sea, they emphasized in a display of 
solipsism, emerged because China ‘as the biggest victims of the Japanese militarism and 
one of the four major victors in WWII’ had not been invited to the 1951 San Francisco 
Conference by the US. Although ‘China is growing into a strong country’, they went on,
the painful memory of history is not long gone. The Chinese people have not forgotten that 
[. . .] why the Chinese people and government are very sensitive about anything that is related 
to territorial integrity and would never allow such recurrence even if it’s just an inch of land.112
The July 2016 award of an arbitral tribunal further deepened China’s isolation. 
Although the judges’ legal clarification of ‘historical waters’, ‘island’ and the coastal 
states’ responsibilities to protect the marine environment are of general relevance, the 
Philippines’ filing of the case against China meant that Beijing was singled out as the 
main culprit flouting international standards of behaviour. The Chinese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs immediately declared that the award ‘is null and void and has no bind-
ing force’113 and that it had resulted from political manoeuvring.114 The state-guided 
press expressed indignation and outrage.115 Scholars and decision-makers in Beijing 
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were convinced that, between 2009 and 2013, the US had been manipulating the issue 
‘behind the scenes’116 and thereby led the Philippine government turn to arbitration to 
shame China.
In short, the emotional action-reaction cycle around maritime territorial disputes 
ensures that China remains caught in the ‘trauma time’ warp: Referring to late 19th and 
early twentieth century international politics, the editors of the authoritative China Daily 
reassured ‘Westerners’ that ‘they have underestimated China’s determination to safe-
guard its sovereignty and territorial integrity’, that ‘the days have long passed when the 
country was seen as the “sick man of East Asia”, whose fate was at the mercy of a few 
Western powers’, and that ‘It is naive to expect China to swallow the bitter pill of humili-
ation from this orchestrated attempt to run roughshod over it’.117 Put differently, the 
Chinese inability to communicate the meaning of the twentieth century’s painful experi-
ences, both domestically and internationally, makes many of its leaders see twenty-first 
century maritime politics through the solipsistic lenses of China’s incessant and solitary 
struggle against the ‘Western’ world.
Conclusion
International hierarchy centred on the Euro-Atlantic ‘West’ and its allies mandates and 
nurtures China’s drive to ‘catch-up’ through rapid economic development and military 
modernization until the present day.118 Paradoxically, China’s developmental success 
and attempts at escaping the warped ‘trauma time’ have been accompanied by an increas-
ing emphasis on China’s national humiliation, both, in the past and in the present. Against 
this emotionally laden background, China’s expanding interests in East Asian seas and 
US-led responses, prompted increasingly insecure Chinese decision-makers to secure 
the South China Sea and embark on land-reclamations of unprecedented scale. Incapable 
of connecting their expansive maritime claims with the reactions of weaker neighbours, 
Chinese leaders strengthened their assertions of China’s enduring ‘peace-loving’ charac-
ter, of a China that, during its 5000 year history ‘never engaged in colonialism or aggres-
sion’.119 Instead of seeking compromise in territorial disputes, a deep sense of being 
misunderstood prevails in Beijing. The 2011 white paper on China’s Peaceful 
Development, for instance, states in an almost pleading tone ‘we sincerely hope that the 
international community will [. . .] support rather than obstruct China’s pursuit of peace-
ful development’.120 President Xi Jinping too, in unusually clear wording, noted that 
Chinese leaders faced ‘prejudices and misunderstanding’ from those who ‘view China 
through coloured glasses and believe that China will inevitably become a threat’, and 
‘even portray China as being the terrifying Mephisto who would someday suck the soul 
of the world’. Such ‘absurdity’, he pointed out, ‘couldn’t be more ridiculous’.121
Hence, the action–reaction cycle of expanding maritime claims and international con-
demnation and isolation has established an emotional structure which perpetuates the 
Chinese people’s need to make sacrifices for achieving a particular kind of a better future, 
and to do so under the strong leadership of the Communist Party. In line with Fierke’s elabo-
ration, the experience of social traumata created the conditions for Chinese leaders to mobi-
lize the solipsism of the group.122 Thus, international hierarchy, as it props-up domestic 
hierarchy, has not helped people in China to gradually address, or ‘encircle’ as Edkins calls 
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it, the traumatic memories of past violence.123 This is problematic because when individual 
isolation and fear is ‘given meaning in the transcendent state which would avenge past 
humiliation’, the potential for the nation to embark on a ‘messianic mission’ increases.124
For now, continuing economic development and especially ‘Western’ recognition of 
China as a new force, as a competitor, rival or even as a threat, ensures the linearity of 
China’s ‘rise’ and rejuvenation. Beijing’s enthusiasm for a New Type of Great Power 
Relations and its engaging in a ‘gentlemen’s competition’125 with Washington is as much 
testimony for this, as President Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).126 Because the BRI 
safeguards jobs through the export of excess capacities and places China above less 
developed Asian and African countries while linking it to the European ‘West’ – also in 
the geopolitical cartographic imagination – is suitable for reducing China’s ideational 
isolation and alleviates the lingering danger of solipsism. Since overcoming ‘national 
humiliation’ remains a task as arduous as creating a ‘moderately well-off society’, how-
ever, the dictum that ‘history if not forgotten can serve as a guide for the future’127 should 
be taken seriously. The question is of course what histories shall be forgotten, and whose 
histories shall be remembered so as to avoid violent pasts repeating themselves.
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